The economist Elias Amor wrapped up his fourth and final analysis of Diaz-Canel's 176 economic measures with a striking declaration: "I've never seen the end so close. I can see it right there."
This statement was made during the closing segment of a program aired on CiberCuba, hosted by Tania Costa, where Amor concluded his assessment of the measures approved by the National Assembly on June 18, 2026.
Amor's optimism is based on three key factors that he believes point in the same direction: GAESA's efforts to reposition assets, the pressure from U.S. sanctions, and the upcoming midterm elections in the United States in November.
The Impact of GAESA's Strategic Moves
Regarding the changes in shareholding within the military conglomerate, the economist was straightforward. "This is a sign that clear messages are being sent, even if we don't hear them, because there's no reason for us to, but things are certainly happening."
He described GAESA's business operations as "hyper-capillary" and highlighted the sale of the Mariel Container Terminal—transferred to Coral Marítima S.A. on July 1—as an indication of the regime's real pressure.
Political and Economic Pressures
This pressure can be traced to a specific time and name: GAESA was directly sanctioned on May 7, 2026, under Trump's Executive Order 14404, and on June 23, the U.S. imposed sanctions on new entities linked to the conglomerate, including AUSA, RAFIN S.A., and BFI.
In the political realm, Amor associates Cuba's current situation with the U.S. electoral calendar. "I am convinced that the November midterm elections, with smart figures like Marco Rubio and Donald Trump, cannot proceed without a balanced stance on Cuba."
Historical Parallels and Personal Insights
Drawing from his personal experiences, Amor recalls that during the 1980s, with Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost, many expected Cuba to follow the Soviet path, which did not happen. Now, he contends, the situation is different.
"I've witnessed a dictatorship fall here in Spain, and it seemed unbelievable that Franco's regime would collapse, but it did, and it vanished. Francoism is no longer spoken of," he said, drawing a direct parallel with Spain's post-Franco transition.
This comparison is not just rhetorical. Born in Cuba in 1958 and residing in Spain since 1969, Amor experienced this process firsthand and uses it as a reference that even the most solid dictatorships can crumble. "Let's see if I witness Cuba's second transition too, which excites me even more," he added.
The economist also humorously addressed accusations of being overly optimistic—or even working for the CIA—saying, "For many years, we've been accused of that and of being optimistic as well, but I just don't want to view reality with sad eyes."
He reserved a personal message for a cousin of his: "I tell her, soon we'll be walking freely on the Malecón together, because it's true, this can't be stopped, and the regime knows it. Therefore, as they know it, they have to step aside and, like in other dictatorships, let the current continue forward."
The program concluded with congratulations to Cuban Americans on July 4th, the 250th anniversary of U.S. independence: "250 years of democracy, freedom, and respect for individual liberty, which we don't have in many places around the world."
Amor's optimism fits within a broader atmosphere of expectations. The Cuban opposition reaffirmed a four-phase transition plan in Madrid on June 1, and experts like Roberto Fernández Rizo mark the beginning of this process on January 3, 2026, when Cuba's economic reliance on Venezuela was severed.
Understanding the Potential Fall of the Cuban Regime
What are the main factors leading to the possible fall of the Cuban regime?
The main factors include GAESA's asset repositioning, increased pressure from U.S. sanctions, and the influence of upcoming U.S. midterm elections.
How has Elias Amor's personal experience influenced his perspective on Cuba?
Elias Amor's firsthand experience of Spain's transition from Franco's dictatorship influences his belief that even entrenched regimes can collapse, drawing parallels with Cuba's situation.