Trump Faces Democratic Congress, But Maintains Stance on Cuba: What's Next After the Midterms?

The significant Republican loss in the November 3 legislative elections marks a new chapter for Donald Trump's administration.

The Democrats have regained control over both chambers of Congress, driven by public dissatisfaction with economic conditions and opposition to the war with Iran. However, how much will this electoral setback actually impact the U.S. offensive against Cuba?

This question requires distinguishing between the Congressional authority to oversee a prolonged conflict and the powers the President still holds to command specific military operations.

Political Shifts in Washington

The political dynamics in Washington have shifted, yet this doesn't automatically dismantle the administration's strategy regarding Cuba.

Starting January 3, 2027, Trump will face a Congress under Democratic control. This new majority will have the power to scrutinize his decisions, block legislative initiatives, review budgets, and hold the administration accountable for military operations.

The 1973 War Powers Act mandates that the President inform Congress within 48 hours of deploying U.S. forces into hostile situations. It also sets a 60-day limit for their engagement without legislative approval, with a possible 30-day extension under exceptional circumstances.

Nevertheless, this legislation does not entirely prevent the President from authorizing brief and limited military actions, although the legality of such actions hinges on their justification and context.

The Military Option Under Examination

A prolonged intervention or occupation of Cuba would face significant political and budgetary hurdles. However, a short operation, akin to the one executed in Venezuela, presents a different scenario.

On January 3, U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro without specific prior authorization from Congress. The administration defended this move as a limited operation, though its legality has been debated both nationally and internationally.

The so-called Donroe Doctrine, an updated version of the historic Monroe Doctrine, aims to restore U.S. dominance in the hemisphere and contain adversarial powers like China, Russia, and Iran.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy explicitly plans for swift and decisive military actions when U.S. regional interests are perceived to be at risk, using the Maduro operation as a prime example.

Cuba holds a unique position within this strategic framework. On January 29, Trump signed an executive order declaring a national emergency regarding the Cuban government's actions, accusing it of collaborating with countries and organizations hostile to the United States. This move intensified economic pressure on Havana, contributing to the broader political and strategic confrontation presented by Washington.

Potential Military Moves and Their Implications

Throughout 2026, military signals have been growing. In May, CBS News reported that U.S. intelligence services were evaluating potential Cuban responses to an attack. By July, the Pentagon had considered various options, including an airborne operation with the 101st Division.

In September, another CBS investigation documented consultations on medical, logistical, and military police unit availability for potential missions under the Southern Command. Officials connected these preparations to plans concerning Cuba, although no deployment orders were issued.

Recently, CiberCuba reported on anti-drone exercises at the Guantanamo Naval Base and increased defense capabilities against unmanned aerial threats.

These movements do not confirm Trump's decision to attack Cuba. However, collectively, they indicate that the military option is being considered within a hemispheric strategy that has previously employed force in Venezuela.

Lessons from Venezuela and Future Challenges

An operation targeting Cuban leaders could have limited objectives, but its execution would entail different political challenges compared to Venezuela.

A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), published in June, analyzed various military scenarios and warned that capturing or eliminating regime figures would not ensure its collapse.

Unlike Venezuela's Chavismo, the Cuban system has more institutionalized power structures, centered around the Communist Party, the Armed Forces, intelligence services, and the military business conglomerate GAESA.

In Venezuela, Washington found interlocutors within Delcy Rodríguez's government willing to cooperate following Maduro's capture. In Cuba, no equivalent faction has been publicly identified to guarantee a transition under U.S. terms.

While U.S. military superiority might allow for a targeted operation, it doesn't necessarily resolve the political issue driving it in the first place.

Political Costs and Cuban-American Perspectives

The conflict with Iran adds a significant challenge. According to the Associated Press, Vice President JD Vance attributed part of the Republican defeat to voter rejection of the war. The new Democratic majority has also pledged to enhance oversight of presidential decisions.

Initiating another military operation, especially one with escalation risks, must be weighed against this political weariness.

However, Cuba has a distinctive aspect: strong support for decisive measures among broad segments of the Cuban-American community in Florida.

The FIU Cuba Poll 2026, conducted among 1,004 Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade, found that 73% favored U.S. military action to overthrow the Havana government. Among proposed methods, clandestine operations received more support than a ground invasion.

This contrasts with a national Marist survey conducted in January, where 61% of Americans opposed military intervention in Cuba.

These figures reflect different populations and moments, but they highlight a reality Washington cannot ignore: political support for a Cuba operation is not uniform across the United States, even though it is significant among Miami's Cuban-Americans.

Trump's Potential Strategy Shift

The President has repeatedly expressed his intention to achieve political change in Cuba before his term ends, linking upcoming actions to developments in the Iranian conflict.

On October 31, he reiterated this goal, noting that Marco Rubio was closely monitoring the Cuban situation.

More notably, on November 4, the State Department released a report on the Donroe Doctrine, where a senior U.S. official stated, "We managed the entire Venezuela project while dealing with Iran, and we're handling Cuba."

This declaration doesn't announce an intervention but suggests the continuity of the hemispheric strategy despite events in the Middle East.

The Democratic victory could heighten Congressional oversight, increase the political cost of new operations, and encourage diplomatic alternatives. Yet, Trump and Rubio still possess significant executive tools to maintain sanctions, negotiations, and other forms of pressure.

For its part, Havana may view the election outcome as an opportunity to bide time, endure until the end of the presidential term, and hope for a policy shift in Washington. However, this strategy offers no guarantees: sanctions may persist, and Cuba's economic crisis continues to worsen.

The midterm elections haven't nullified the potential military option against Cuba nor ended the U.S. pressure strategy. But there's also no public evidence that Trump has decided to order an intervention.

The fundamental question extends beyond presidential powers or Pentagon maneuvers: if Washington succeeds in weakening or decapitating the regime through a limited operation, who would take power, and how would a political transition be ensured?

The answer to this question is critical for turning a potential military victory into the political change the Trump administration claims to pursue.