The Cuban military conglomerate, GAESA, is reportedly using small and medium-sized private enterprises (SMEs) to tap into fuel imported from the United States, thereby circumventing American sanctions. This scheme allegedly allows GAESA to manage the distribution and profit from these imports.
Economist Emilio Morales, who serves as vice president of Cuba Siglo 21 and president of Havana Consulting Group, makes these claims in his report titled "Fuel Control: A New Tool of Pressure on the Cuban Mafia State," released on Tuesday.
The Role of SMEs in Fuel Transactions
With the capture of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026 and the subsequent halt of Venezuelan oil supplies, the United States revised its policies to permit certain fuel exports to eligible Cuban private companies. According to Morales, out of almost 390 SMEs initially considered, about 42 received authorization in the early stages. Some of these businesses reportedly have ties to GAESA's corporate network.
Entities involved include Servitec Mariel, Cubapac Internacional, and Galla, as well as China's Fujian Trebor Trading Company and Florida-based Vanguard Energy. A report by ADN Cuba, referenced by Morales, identified 21 CIMEX fuel suppliers, including at least 16 SMEs, based on internal documents issued between May and September 2026.
How GAESA Might Control Revenue
Morales argues that importing SMEs rely on a commercial and financial infrastructure dominated by the military conglomerate. Gas stations fall under Inmobiliaria CIMEX, while consumers use Clásica and Clásica Empresarial cards from FINCIMEX for payments.
The report suggests that revenues are deposited in Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI), a GAESA-linked entity that allegedly handles over 95% of Cuba's business and foreign currency transactions. This setup enables the military conglomerate to benefit from operations officially conducted by private companies, despite U.S. restrictions aimed at preventing advantages for sanctioned military entities.
The High Cost of Fuel Imports
The study estimates the cost of acquiring and shipping a 25,000-liter gasoline isotank at around $90,487, while a diesel isotank would cost $134,262. Subsequent operations would add approximately $40,487 for gasoline and $84,262 for diesel, excluding all internal distribution expenses.
Morales suggests that a company would need at least ten isotanks for a viable commercial operation, necessitating upfront payment for shipments. These requirements pose challenges for independent small businesses without access to capital and foreign currency structures.
U.S. Fuel Exports to Cuba Exceed $232 Million
According to data from the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council cited in the report, U.S. fuel and derivative exports to Cuba totaled approximately $232 million from January to August 2026. In August alone, exports reached $74.86 million.
Energy specialist Jorge Piñón from the University of Texas believes this volume indicates that CUPET continues to play a crucial role in receiving and distributing the fuel. The investigation also records 1,628 isotank returns since April 2026, through operations linked to Agencia Marítima Taína and Seaboard Marine.
Morales raises doubts about the financial capacity of independent SMEs to sustain such a commercial volume.
The Venezuelan Oil Precedent
Morales estimates that GAESA earned around $30 billion between 2010 and 2025 from reselling Venezuelan oil received by Cuba to third parties. He calculates that 40% to 50% of that fuel was later sold in Asian markets.
The interruption of Venezuelan shipments forced the military conglomerate to seek alternative mechanisms to maintain supply and revenue.
Sanctions and Fuel Diversion
Washington has tightened restrictions on Cuban companies involved in the energy sector, including CUPET, ENETEC, and COREYDAN. U.S. authorities reported intercepting 90 fuel shipments intended for ENETEC: 71 in Port Everglades and 19 in Houston.
The seizures amounted to approximately 600,000 gallons, or 2.27 million liters, valued at $2.8 million. In September, 14ymedio documented a gas station near Villa Marista, the State Security headquarters, supplying vehicles linked to the Ministry of the Interior.
In October, the State Department acknowledged that it could not rule out that some of the fuel exported to the private sector might end up in the hands of government-linked entities.
Morales concludes that as long as GAESA controls installations, payment mechanisms, and financial infrastructure, SMEs are unlikely to operate independently in Cuba's fuel market.
Understanding GAESA's Influence on Fuel Imports
What role do SMEs play in GAESA's fuel import strategy?
SMEs are allegedly used by GAESA to access and distribute U.S. fuel imports, allowing the military conglomerate to manage distribution and profits while evading sanctions.
How does GAESA control the revenue from these fuel imports?
GAESA controls the infrastructure, including gas stations and financial institutions, ensuring revenues are channeled through their networks, despite operations appearing to be conducted by private SMEs.
What challenges do independent SMEs face in the Cuban fuel market?
Independent SMEs struggle due to high costs and the need for substantial capital and foreign currency access, which are difficult to secure without backing from larger structures.