Cuban Reforms Claim Sovereignty Yet Seek U.S. Approval

A recent post by Sonia Hernández Camacho, an official at the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX), has highlighted a growing contradiction within the regime's discourse on its economic reforms. While Havana portrays these changes as internal and sovereign decisions, much of its diplomatic narrative seems to focus more on how Washington perceives them rather than the views of the Cuban people.

Hernández Camacho, identified as the Director of Bilateral Affairs for the U.S. at MINREX, reacted on Facebook to new U.S. measures, effective from September 30, with a telling remark: "The latest measures announced by the U.S. Government [...] are the most recent proof that no matter what Cuba does to try to advance, develop, and diversify its economy and economic actors, it will never be enough for the U.S."

Her statement does not explicitly admit that the reforms were designed to appease the United States. However, it frames the reforms within a logic of external validation: Cuba "acts," Washington "evaluates," and, according to the official, nothing suffices. This shifts the debate from tangible outcomes for the Cuban populace to the political response of the U.S. government.

The Dual Nature of Cuban Reforms

Since June, the Cuban government has been adamant that the 176 economic and social transformations are self-determined actions. President Miguel Díaz-Canel asserted that these were not adopted "due to Yankee pressures" and later denied they were meant to "please the United States." Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz also defended the package as a "100% Cuban" transformation carried out "with full sovereignty," despite the government's acknowledgment of studying experiences like those of China and Vietnam.

Yet, Hernández Camacho's post introduces an awkward nuance. Her focus is not on how these measures might improve the daily lives of Cubans but on Washington's refusal to acknowledge them. Power outages, inflation, shortages, depreciated wages, mass emigration, and public distrust are sidelined in favor of claiming that the U.S. does not appreciate the changes unveiled by Havana.

Shifting Rhetoric Amidst Political Tensions

This rhetorical shift is not isolated. In recent months, the Cuban regime has alternated its tone according to the political climate. In February, CiberCuba documented how a MINREX statement avoided typical Castroist terms like "blockade," "imperialism," "aggression," or "enemy," adopting a more technical and diplomatic language open to dialogue with the U.S.

The same occurred with the Guantanamo Naval Base, where Cuban military communications moved from historical rhetoric about "occupied territory" to a more neutral description as a "military enclave," avoiding traditional sovereignty claims. In both cases, the regime seemed to adjust its language to appear pragmatic to Washington.

Hernández Camacho's publication reveals the flip side of this discourse strategy. When portraying itself as a viable interlocutor, Havana softens its vocabulary; when Washington toughens its stance or fails to validate its gestures, it reverts to the narrative of external grievance.

Cuban Reforms in the Context of U.S. Sanctions

The U.S. measures cited by Hernández Camacho include additional restrictions on direct and indirect financial transactions with entities on the Cuba Restricted List, the removal of authorization for U-Turn banking operations, and the withdrawal of a license allowing U.S.-jurisdiction banks to maintain certain accounts for Cuban private entrepreneurs.

Hernández Camacho presented these decisions as evidence that Washington holds "the same disdain" for the Cuban private sector as it does for the government and the "revolutionary people." She also claimed that the U.S. has "dropped the mask" of supporting the Cuban people and private sector.

The paradox is hard to ignore. For years, the Cuban regime has limited the autonomy of private actors through authorizations, controls, import restrictions, caps, inspections, and a legal framework subordinate to Communist Party decisions. Now, when U.S. sanctions impact this sector, the official discourse tries to present itself as its defender, without admitting the weight of internal obstacles that hinder its development.

The tension escalates when considering the regime's latest balance. Marrero claimed this week that 158 out of the 176 transformations, equating to 89% of the package, have already been implemented. However, this supposed regulatory progress has not translated into a perceptible improvement for the population, which continues to face a crisis marked by shortages, inflation, and deteriorating basic services.

In this context, the message from the MINREX official is revealing. The issue is not just that Havana blames Washington for the limits of its reforms, but that it seems to need the U.S. reaction to give them political meaning.

The regime insists it does not change to satisfy the White House, yet its spokespersons react as if the U.S. judgment is central in assessing the extent of these changes.

If the reforms were truly sovereign, they would have to be legitimized by their impact on the everyday lives of Cubans. So far, the regime boasts about transformations, denounces sanctions, and adjusts its language according to the interlocutor, while the population continues to wait for results.

This contradiction encapsulates the core issue: Havana claims to look inward but repeatedly turns to Washington to explain what it fails to demonstrate in Cuba.