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Economist Criticizes Díaz-Canel's Economic Reforms as Deceptive

Thursday, October 1, 2026 by Robert Castillo

Economist Elías Amor quickly expressed his opinion on the economic measures announced by Miguel Díaz-Canel during an extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, calling it "a grand deception, to sum it up," in an interview with Tania Costa.

The extraordinary session of the Cuban Communist Party took place on June 17 and 18, 2026, where a package of 176 economic and social reforms was endorsed. This initiative, the largest reform attempt by the regime in decades, promises increased autonomy for state-owned enterprises, encourages foreign investment in the private sector, and proposes a reduction in the number of ministries.

Historical Skepticism

Amor argues that history provides ample reason for skepticism. "We've seen this before, like when Raúl Castro came to power with the guidelines. What happened? They eventually backtracked because, for whatever reason, there was no political will," he remarked, referencing the reforms approved at the PCC's VI Congress in 2011.

The process promised a "model update" with more room for non-state management. However, assessments revealed that by 2018, only 21% of the guidelines had been implemented. "I fear that many of these measures will also be rolled back," Amor cautioned.

Terminology and Implementation Concerns

The first component of the reform package, which focuses on both state and non-state economic actors, raised concerns for Amor right from the terminology used. "Why keep referring to non-state actors? Wouldn't it be simpler to talk about private and public entities? Clearly, they avoid using the term 'private' like it's the plague," he questioned.

Regarding the measure expanding the autonomy of state enterprises to operate under similar conditions as other economic players, Amor was blunt. "Honestly, whoever drafted this is a brainless communist, because in Cuba, a self-employed worker or a micro-enterprise doesn't have the same level of operation, autonomy, and power as a state enterprise," he argued.

Financial Challenges and Political Will

Amor also criticized the decentralization of wholesale and retail pricing to the state enterprises themselves, interpreting it not as true liberalization but merely a shift in control from the ministry to these entities.

Concerning the OSDEs—Superior Organizations of Business Management—Amor was direct: "If they truly want Cuba's economy to improve and prosper, they should eliminate the OSDEs, which are useless."

His pessimistic outlook is supported by stark figures. By the end of May 2026, 363 state enterprises in Cuba were reporting losses, a 44% increase from the same period in 2025, with declared deficits exceeding 5,300 million pesos.

Amor summed up his stance with a metaphor about the state of Cuban state enterprises: "The state enterprise is one of the great failures of the Cuban communist regime. It simply doesn't work."

While acknowledging that some measures in the package may be new, Amor warns that the political will to sustain them over time is the same factor that doomed the 2011 reforms, and nothing about the regime's behavior suggests this time will be any different.

Understanding Cuba's Economic Reforms

What are the main components of the proposed economic reforms in Cuba?

The proposed reforms include increased autonomy for state enterprises, encouragement of foreign investment in the private sector, and a reduction in the number of ministries.

Why does Elías Amor criticize the use of the term "non-state actors"?

Amor believes the term "non-state actors" is unnecessarily complex and suggests using "private and public entities" instead. He criticizes the avoidance of the term "private" by the regime.

How does Amor view the decentralization of pricing in Cuba?

Amor sees the decentralization of pricing as a mere shift of control from the ministry to state enterprises, rather than a genuine liberalization of the market.

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