Harvard Group Suggests Cuban Authorities Pave Way for Democratic Transition

Is it feasible for Cuba to dismantle a political system that has endured for nearly seven decades without, at least initially, involving some of the individuals and institutions that currently uphold it?

This question is at the heart of one of the most sensitive proposals from the Harvard Working Group on Cuba's Future. Developed after six months of effort from scholars, economists, activists, and specialists brought together by Harvard University's Cuba Studies Program and the Afro-Latin American Research Institute, the report addresses this query.

Outlining Cuba's Dire Situation

The document paints a picture of a nation reeling from profound economic, demographic, energy, health, and political crises. It argues that there is no viable solution without immediate political reforms and the establishment of a transitional government perceived as legitimate.

Yet, it introduces a critical premise: this process might not necessarily begin only after the complete dissolution of the current power structure.

Role of Current Authorities in Transition

"Cuban authorities must take the lead in this process and act as facilitators," the report insists, emphasizing a peaceful resolution.

The authors acknowledge that not all political players in Cuba and the diaspora share this view. Nonetheless, they believe that addressing the crisis requires the involvement of all parties, including the present authorities.

Timing of the Proposal and International Dynamics

This proposal surfaces at a particularly sensitive time. In 2026, the potential for a transition moved beyond the realm of opposition and academic studies, entering the discourse on Washington's strategy towards Havana.

In August, reports surfaced suggesting that Donald Trump's administration was exploring a strategy to engage interlocutors within the existing Cuban system to manage a potential transition. This approach was described as a transformation rather than an abrupt dismantling of the regime.

Further reporting by Bloomberg indicated that Washington was attempting to discern where real power lies in Cuba, beyond President Miguel Díaz-Canel, focusing significantly on the Castro family, the military, the Communist Party structure, and other elite sectors.

Barriers to Negotiation

The challenge remains in determining how far the Cuban regime is willing to go. In February, Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío publicly outlined their red lines: dialogue with Washington is acceptable, but not at the expense of the constitution, socialist economy, or government system.

Harvard's Approach to Change

The Harvard Working Group's inclusion of current authorities in the transition plan does not imply maintaining the status quo. Their roadmap begins with foundational changes to the repressive framework: a general amnesty for political prisoners, decriminalizing protest and expression forms, repealing repressive decrees, and eliminating travel restrictions for so-called "regulated" individuals.

The report advocates for the free movement of all Cubans in and out of the country, suggesting these initial steps as clear indicators of the beginning of a rule of law.

Washington's Potential Response

According to the authors, Washington should respond "immediately, positively, and decisively" by lifting sanctions affecting fuel supply and providing initial resources to stabilize the economy and support reforms.

Final Vision for Cuba's Future

The ultimate stage goes beyond cosmetic reforms of the existing system. In the medium to long term, the document advocates for a new Constituent Assembly, a democratic and pluralistic system, and a market economy recognizing various property forms, including private ownership.

Administering Cuba Through Transition

This proposal aligns with a challenge recently analyzed by independent civil society regarding different roadmaps for transition: between the fall of a regime and the birth of a democracy, someone must keep the state functioning.

Hospitals, electricity, water, courts, public safety, ports, airports, schools, local administration, and food distribution cannot be suspended while a new political system is built.

Proposals reviewed by independent civil society, such as the Cuban American Bar Association's Fundamental Law of Transition, are based on the need to temporarily retain laws and institutions compatible with democratic principles to prevent an institutional vacuum.

The Paradox of Repression

The Harvard report notes a particularly severe obstacle for any negotiated formula: the regime has long dismantled many potential interlocutors now needed for a transition.

Imprisonment, harassment, and exile have disbanded independent movements, reduced organizational spaces, and forced numerous activists, intellectuals, and professionals out of the country.

"The island's depopulation is not only demographic," the document warns.

The outcome is a nation with a weakened independent civil society and insufficiently organized opposition, precisely when it might require capable actors for negotiation and assuming institutional responsibilities.

Who Holds Negotiating Power?

One more hurdle remains: identifying who truly represents Cuban power.

The report questions the "extreme opacity" of discussions between Cuban and US representatives and mentions individuals presented as national interlocutors without clearly established government roles.

Specifically, it cites Colonel Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, Raúl Castro's grandson, who holds no known official position but is linked to the military conglomerate GAESA.

According to the Working Group, GAESA operates as a "state within a state," controlling key economic sectors and managing financial flows beyond ordinary institutional oversight.

Defining Transition Goals

The debate ultimately reveals two often-confused issues. One is defining the destination: free elections, political pluralism, fundamental rights, and a democratic state. Another, far more complex, is determining how to reach that point without causing a power vacuum, institutional crisis, or prolongation of the regime under another guise.

The Cuban opposition has advanced its own response in 2026. Organizations around the Liberation Accord have outlined a sequence of liberation, stabilization, reconstruction, and democratization, with a provisional government as a bridge to free elections.

The Harvard Working Group now adds another piece to this discussion: current Cuban authorities would need to initiate and facilitate the process, even though the final outcome they propose is to replace the existing political system with a democratic and pluralistic one.

The question remains whether actors within a structure designed to prevent alternation are willing to facilitate their transformation.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently summed up this dilemma from another angle. Washington, he stated, is open to dialogue, but those currently in power must decide if they truly want to pursue a different future for Cuba. His current assessment is negative: "at this moment, they do not want to."

The Harvard report acknowledges that reaching a consensus among the government, the United States, the opposition, civil society, the diaspora, and the international community will be extraordinarily challenging.

But their proposal places a concrete issue at the center of the post-day debate: perhaps the question is not only who will replace the current Cuban power, but also what part of the existing structures will be necessary to enable, without chaos or violence, the transition to the system that should replace it.