From Plans to Power: Transforming Cuba's Civil Society into a Viable Government Alternative

Investigative Series by CiberCuba | Part Three of Four

In the first two parts of this series, we've uncovered two critical insights. For decades, Cuba's independent civil society has been contemplating how a transition might unfold and what steps are necessary to govern and rebuild the nation.

There are numerous proposals covering plebiscites, negotiations, provisional governments, constitutions, transitional justice, economics, infrastructure, health, education, security, and diaspora participation. Despite this extensive framework, it still falls short of forming an actual government.

What Hinders Formation of a Recognized Political Alternative?

The pressing question now is: What is needed to transform this dispersed knowledge into a legitimized political alternative capable of wielding power if Cuba faces a governance crisis or enters a transition?

Another critical query remains in the background. If Cuban-American entrepreneurs are publicly discussing significant financial commitments for a transitioning Cuba, could a portion of these resources—alongside philanthropic, academic, and international funding—help build the necessary political, technical, and administrative capacities?

The goal isn't to fund a political party or designate a government from Miami. The real question is whether an intermediary space exists between having hundreds of documents and establishing a genuine transition infrastructure.

Bridging the Final Gap in Transition

Organizing the existing proposals presents a tangible problem. While there are lawyers drafting transitional laws, economists planning stabilization strategies, and experts in various sectors, a cohesive structure uniting individuals, programs, authority, procedures, and executive capacity is missing.

This isn't merely a semantic issue. A document might outline how a provisional government should function, but that doesn't mean a team is ready to assume its roles. Similarly, a roadmap might prioritize electrical reconstruction, but it doesn't guarantee a structure to oversee and execute those projects.

Leadership Challenges in a Fragmented Opposition

The fragmentation of Cuba's opposition isn't just about ideological disagreements. While there are real differences on negotiation versus rupture, plebiscite versus constituent assembly, and other issues, there's also significant agreement on pluralistic democracy, political freedoms, rule of law, competitive elections, judicial independence, and economic openness.

However, these agreements haven't materialized into a unified political authority. Recent coalitions like the Liberation Agreement, involving over 50 organizations, highlight efforts toward coordination, but none can claim to represent all Cubans advocating change.

The Reality of a Provisional Government

Efforts by groups like the Cuban American Bar Association and platforms such as Cuba Próxima and CTDC have developed transitional legal frameworks and agendas. Yet, a crucial gap remains between institutional design and political capability. Key questions about appointing, recognizing, and managing a provisional government remain unresolved, requiring political legitimacy and a structure that can enforce accepted rules.

Security Forces: A Sensitive Issue

The gap extends to security control, where proposals often suggest civilian oversight of armed forces and law enforcement. However, the practical challenge is determining who temporarily manages these forces, borders, prisons, strategic infrastructures, intelligence services, and arsenals during a transition.

Complexities of Property Rights

Property rights present another significant challenge. While many proposals support private property rights, Cuba's unique patrimonial situation involves state assets, confiscated properties, and claims from former owners and new businesses. Achieving political consensus on a restitution mechanism is crucial for legitimacy.

Financial Resources and Transition Architecture

Potential capital injection, as discussed by figures like Jorge Mas Santos, could range from $35 billion to $80 billion for Cuba's transformation. However, even with capital availability, an architecture capable of absorbing and managing these funds is vital. It requires state capacity—institutions, professionals, and management systems to turn resources into tangible outcomes while minimizing corruption.

Establishing a Cuban "Shadow Government"?

Rather than an externally proclaimed government, a more feasible approach is a national, pluralistic, and transparent transition platform. This entity wouldn't replace the legitimacy of future elections but would be prepared to govern if a provisional authority becomes necessary.

The legitimacy of such a platform depends on balancing representation, transparency, autonomy, and technical capacity. It's a complex challenge, but delaying its resolution risks unpreparedness when a crisis arises.

This investigation highlights the need for mechanisms that translate existing ideas into political and administrative capabilities—requiring people, organization, resources, coordination, and legitimacy. The capital is a crucial variable, but without resources, legitimacy alone cannot build governance capacity.