The Cuban regime has seemingly fabricated a nonexistent contradiction to counter Washington's evolving narrative on Cuba. Havana argues that the United States cannot label the island as a failing state while simultaneously tagging it as a threat to national security.
This notion has moved beyond being a mere offhand remark. Recently, Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, the national coordinator of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), employed this argument to challenge remarks made by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Moreover, the latest analysis from Cubadebate's Media Observatory reiterates this point as a primary objection to the U.S. discourse.
The repetition of this argument indicates it has become a key element in the official response. According to this reasoning, if Washington views Cuba as economically devastated and institutionally in crisis, it cannot also credit the nation with espionage, influence, or destabilization capabilities.
Understanding the Reality of a Failing State
A failing state is a complex concept with no universally accepted definition. However, most frameworks of state fragility do not require the complete disappearance of the government, loss of territorial control, or the absence of military and intelligence services.
Indicators such as economic decline, population exodus, loss of legitimacy, public service collapse, human rights violations, or closed elite circles are commonly used to assess state fragility.
In Cuba, symptoms of decline are evident: energy crises, food and medicine shortages, infrastructure degradation, mass emigration, and an economy that offers little hope to its citizens. Despite this, the regime maintains significant coercive power.
The Misunderstanding of Institutional vs. Coercive Power
The supposed paradox vanishes when differentiating between institutional and coercive capacities. A government may fail at providing basic services such as electricity, food, and housing while remaining effective in surveillance, control, incarceration, intelligence gathering, and self-preservation.
This asymmetry is one of the most striking features of Cuba's system: it has shown greater aptitude for retaining power than for effectively managing the country.
A Poor Nation is Not Necessarily Harmless
The new U.S. narrative does not claim that Cuba poses a threat through military or economic competition with the United States. Instead, the focus is on intelligence activities, influence operations, relationships with U.S. adversaries, and the strategic use of Cuba's geographical position.
Cuba's history provides judicially proven examples. Ana Belén Montes, a former Pentagon intelligence analyst, spied for Havana for years. In 2024, former U.S. ambassador Víctor Manuel Rocha pleaded guilty to decades of clandestine activity for Cuba.
These cases illustrate that Cuba does not need to be an economic or military powerhouse to have an effective intelligence apparatus. Material poverty does not equate to operational impotence.
The Fragility-Threat Connection
Another flaw in the official argument is the assumption that international threats only originate from strong states. International experience shows that fragile states can pose risks through migration crises, human trafficking, illicit economies, regional conflicts, humanitarian crises, or foreign actors exploiting their territory.
In Cuba, mass emigration exemplifies how an internal crisis can affect other nations. The economic and social decline extends beyond the island, impacting neighboring countries' immigration systems and facilitating human trafficking networks.
Thus, even before addressing U.S. accusations of espionage and influence, Havana's premise is flawed: a state's fragility can indeed be a source of external risks.
A Weak Argument in Response to Washington
The regime could challenge the evidence in the U.S. report, demand proof of specific accusations, question the methodology, or point out the political intentions of the Trump administration. Such actions would contribute to a reasonable debate.
However, simply reiterating that Washington must choose between labeling Cuba a failing state or a threat does not dismantle the new framework of the current administration. Washington aims to shift the perception of the Cuban regime, not only as a human rights or authoritarian issue but also as a matter of security, intelligence, and geopolitical influence.
Addressing this shift requires engaging with the concrete evidence supporting it. The real question is not whether a severely deteriorated state can still impact another nation's interests but what capabilities the Cuban regime retains today, how it uses them, and the extent to which Washington can substantiate its claims.
This is the serious debate that needs to happen. Persisting with the "failing state or threat" argument fails to answer these questions and merely turns a conceptually and historically disprovable false dilemma into one of the propaganda pillars against a far more intricate American strategy.
Understanding Cuba's State vs. Threat Debate
What is the main argument of Havana against the U.S. narrative on Cuba?
Havana argues that the U.S. cannot simultaneously consider Cuba a failing state and a threat to national security, asserting that these two concepts are mutually exclusive.
What does the U.S. report "Cuba: the Capital of Communism in the 21st Century" focus on?
The report shifts the debate towards Cuba's intelligence activities, influence operations, relationships with U.S. adversaries, and strategic use of its geographical position.
Can a failing state still pose a threat?
Yes, a failing state can still pose threats through various means such as migration crises, human trafficking, illicit economies, and more, as demonstrated by international experiences.
What examples illustrate Cuba's intelligence capabilities despite economic challenges?
Cases like Ana Belén Montes and Víctor Manuel Rocha show that Cuba maintains effective intelligence operations without being an economic or military power.