"There will be no capitalist shifts in Cuba."
That was the declaration made by Miguel Díaz-Canel in July 2018, a mere three months after stepping into the role of Cuban President. At the time, he seemed to stand as the beacon of "continuity" for the regime established by the late dictator Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl.
Fast forward eight years, and those words have taken on a new significance.
The Cuban government has recently unveiled 176 measures, significantly broadening the scope for market mechanisms, private property, private enterprise, and foreign investment.
These reforms include joint-stock companies, private banking and exchange houses, foreign investment linked to the non-state sector, increased business autonomy, and new strategies for pricing, wages, and inter-actor economic relations.
Despite these advancements, Díaz-Canel vehemently denies that this opening represents a shift toward capitalism. "We are not abandoning socialism," he asserted when the measures were announced.
In a recent address to international communist and worker party representatives, he reiterated: "This is a process to energize the economy, not to establish capitalism; there will be no rampant privatization."
The Journey from "No Capitalist Shifts" to Economic Reforms
The journey from Díaz-Canel's 2018 categorical "no capitalist shifts" to the need to specify in 2026 that there will be no "rampant privatization" highlights the trajectory of Cuba's economic evolution.
This transformation didn't materialize overnight. Its roots trace back to the reform process initiated by Raúl Castro and outlined in the Economic and Social Policy Guidelines approved at the VI Congress of the Communist Party in 2011.
Back then, the regime conceded certain market mechanisms and non-state management forms to "update" an economy plagued by structural issues, yet maintained an ideological boundary: reforms must preserve socialism.
When Díaz-Canel assumed the presidency in 2018, he inherited this process. Instead of promising a breakaway, he positioned himself as a promoter of "continuity" and firmly rejected any "capitalist shift."
Revisiting Economic Policies Amid Crisis
Three years into his tenure, the so-called Task Reorganization was implemented. This monetary reform altered wages, pensions, prices, tariffs, and subsidies but quickly revealed significant issues.
Just weeks after its implementation, Díaz-Canel himself admitted, "We need to reorganize the Reorganization."
By 2023, he was even more candid, acknowledging the government's evaluation of "where we might have gone wrong in the Reorganization" and "what we may have done incorrectly." The promise was to "rectify."
This was followed by another approach: "correcting distortions and reigniting the economy." And now, the 176 measures have been introduced.
The sequence is unmistakable: updating, organizing, reorganizing the organized, rectifying, correcting distortions, reigniting, and reforming once more.
During this time, Cuba has endured years of inflation, currency devaluation, the collapse of the electrical system, blackouts, food and medicine shortages, deteriorating public services, and mass emigration.
Díaz-Canel now openly acknowledges part of the outcome: "Yes, we have many shortages. We are overwhelmed by blackouts, water scarcity, inflation, and long lines."
Balancing Market Reforms with Socialist Ideals
Despite the scale of these new reforms, Díaz-Canel maintains that the ideological goal remains unchanged.
In his recent speech, he explicitly recognized that economic recovery would rely on both state and private enterprises: "This will be the task of everyone, of the state and non-state enterprises, along with other economic management forms that together make up the Cuban business framework."
However, he immediately defined the intended purpose of this framework: "Focused on a single goal: 'building a prosperous and sustainable socialism.'"
He described the economic transformation as an "update" conducted "under the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba" and "without ever abandoning the principles of socialism."
The paradox is evident: after decades of restrictions on private property and the market, the regime needs to expand their roles to attempt to pull the economy out of crisis, yet continues to frame these tools as means to bolster socialism.
The 176 measures don't instantly transform Cuba into a capitalist economy. The state retains substantial economic control, and the government resists any transition to that system.
However, it's challenging to reconcile the economy Díaz-Canel envisioned in 2018 with the one he is attempting to build by 2026.
The process has been brewing since the Guidelines and has advanced through reforms, halts, and successive rectifications. What eight years of crisis appear to have altered is the urgency and depth of concessions to the market.
In 2018, Díaz-Canel asserted there would be "no capitalist shifts."
By 2026, he acknowledges more private enterprise, foreign capital, and market mechanisms; he no longer promises that there will be no privatization, only that it won't be "rampant."
And as the economic script evolves, he insists that the objective remains the same: "building socialism."
What, then, remains of that categorical "no capitalist shifts"?
Understanding Cuba's Economic Reforms
What are the new economic measures introduced in Cuba?
Cuba has announced 176 measures that expand market mechanisms, private property, private initiative, and foreign investment. These include joint-stock companies, private banking, foreign investment in the non-state sector, business autonomy, and new mechanisms for pricing and wages.
Why is Díaz-Canel denying a shift towards capitalism?
Díaz-Canel insists that despite the new reforms, Cuba is not abandoning socialism. He emphasizes that the changes are meant to energize the economy without establishing capitalism, maintaining that the nation's ideological goals remain intact.
How do these reforms compare to earlier economic policies in Cuba?
The current reforms build upon Raúl Castro's 2011 Economic and Social Policy Guidelines, which already allowed for some market mechanisms and non-state management forms. However, the new measures represent a deeper concession to market forces amid ongoing economic crises.