On Tuesday, Fincimex announced that remittances sent from abroad can now be collected in cash in U.S. dollars directly at Casa de Cambio (Cadeca) offices. This move is presented by the regime as an expansion of options for Cubans receiving funds from overseas.
However, this is not an act of openness. It is the latest reconfiguration of a state monopoly that has been siphoning off foreign currency sent by the diaspora to their families on the island for decades.
Fincimex is a subsidiary of GAESA, the military conglomerate that controls between 40% and 60% of Cuba's foreign currency income. Leaked internal documents from 2025 revealed that its total revenues are 3.2 times greater than the state budget, and that the country's international reserves are held in GAESA accounts, rather than the Central Bank.
Besides offering cash collection, Fincimex allows beneficiaries to deposit all or part of the funds onto the Clásica card. This card is designed to funnel money into the state commercial network: CIMEX stores, Tiendas Caribe, and fuel stations, where GAESA operates with profit margins of 240% and prices up to four times higher than U.S. establishments.
Background on Remittance Challenges
The announcement comes after the systematic collapse of formal remittance channels. In June 2020, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Fincimex, prompting Western Union to suspend its operations in Cuba in November of that year.
The regime then established Orbit S.A., a front company under CIMEX/GAESA control, to reclaim those financial flows. In January 2025, the Trump administration added Orbit S.A. to the Cuba Restricted List, once again blocking Western Union and forcing Cubamax to halt its transfers.
The U.S. State Department justified the sanction, stating it aimed to prevent resources from flowing to sectors that oppress and surveil the Cuban people while controlling large portions of the island's economy.
The Shift to Informal Channels
This cycle of sanctions and maneuvers has been devastating for the formal remittance channel. In 2024, GAESA collected only 81.6 million dollars through formal remittances, a mere 4.13% of the total compared to 1,972 million in 2023.
Over 95% of the flow shifted to approximately 150 informal "banks" that offer quick delivery in hard currency and favorable rates, according to an analysis by Cuba Siglo 21 published in December 2024.
Formal remittances have plummeted by 70% compared to 2019 when they reached around 3.7 billion dollars. In this context, Cadeca's new measure is an attempt by the state to reclaim the flow that has slipped into the informal market.
Additional Financial Pressures
Adding to this scenario is the 1% federal tax the United States has applied since January 1, 2026, on remittances sent abroad via cash, money order, or cashier's check. This policy raises the cost of formal remittances and provides the regime with another narrative tool to blame Washington while solidifying its position as the sole intermediary available in the official channel.
This dynamic is not new. Since the regime legalized dollar possession in September 1993, the state has devised successive mechanisms to capture foreign currency entering through remittances. These include diplotiendas, the convertible peso (CUC), and now the Clásica card.
U.S. sanctions, rather than dismantling this monopoly, have historically served to eliminate private competitors and justify state control over foreign currency.
Remittances account for 8.3% of Cuba's GDP, and nearly 70% of the population receives them in some form, making this flow a critical lifeline for both families and the apparatus that intercepts them.
Understanding Cuba's Remittance Landscape
Why has Fincimex's role in remittances been controversial?
Fincimex is seen as part of a state monopoly that captures foreign currency sent by Cubans abroad to their families, channeling it through state-controlled networks and reducing private competition.
What impact have U.S. sanctions had on Cuban remittances?
U.S. sanctions have disrupted formal remittance channels, leading to a shift towards informal networks. Sanctions have also been used to justify state control over foreign currency flows.
How significant are remittances to Cuba's economy?
Remittances are crucial, accounting for 8.3% of Cuba's GDP and supporting nearly 70% of the population, making them essential for both families and the state apparatus.