U.S. Continues Oil Pressure on Cuba Despite Lifting Tariffs: Experts Weigh In

The White House's recent decision to remove tariffs on entities supplying oil to Cuba does not signify an end to the island's energy challenges.

On the contrary, "the U.S. can extend its oil pressure on Cuba even without tariffs," two Washington-based experts cautioned EFE on Tuesday.

Last week, President Donald Trump signed an executive order eliminating the punitive tariff mechanism under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), complying with a Supreme Court ruling that determined the act does not authorize the president to impose trade duties.

With this signature, one of the key elements of the January 29 executive order, which threatened tariffs on countries or companies sending crude oil to Cuba, has been nullified.

However, the other critical element remains: the declaration of a "national emergency" due to the "unusual and extraordinary threat" posed by the Cuban government, according to Washington.

John Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, warned against seeing the tariff withdrawal as a substantial relief.

"I wouldn't dare say that the January 29 executive order is a paper tiger. If it has teeth, it can still be frightening," he stated.

He believes that "the Cuban government would make a significant mistake if it saw the Supreme Court's decision as a protective shield."

Pedro Freyre, a Cuban-American attorney and partner at the Akerman law firm specializing in Cuban-related litigation, echoed this sentiment.

"The White House has reversed that mechanism's implementation but left the door open for other potential actions," he explained.

"Given this administration's approach, I believe they will use other tools," Freyre added.

These "other tools" could include Treasury Department banking measures or secondary sanctions against entities facilitating energy supplies to the island.

So far, the administration has not publicly detailed what mechanisms might be activated.

"The Tactic of Fear"

Kavulich suggests that part of the strategy aligns with Trump's usual pattern: issuing threats that have a deterrent effect without needing to be carried out.

"It's the tactic of fear," he noted.

The expert speculated it would be "interesting" to see Washington's reaction if Cuba purchased oil from a "sanctions-free country at market prices," transported in "a ship not part of the phantom fleet and with all paperwork in order."

He also found it revealing to consider a scenario where Russia sent a tanker "escorted by a military ship," complicating any U.S. intervention attempts.

However, he doubted such events would occur, as "Cuba is not that significant to anyone" at the moment.

According to Kavulich, a "minority" in Washington might support allowing Russia or China to supply "some oil and fuels" to Cuba to prevent a humanitarian crisis, without dismantling the energy blockade as a political pressure tool.

Policy Change, Not Necessarily Regime Change

Both Freyre and Kavulich agree that the U.S. administration's priority is not necessarily a leadership change in Havana but rather a shift in economic and political decisions.

"The Administration has been emphatic in demanding a policy change in Cuba. Not necessarily a regime change, but a policy shift," Freyre emphasized.

Kavulich summarized the prevailing approach in certain Washington circles: "We will accept the same people remaining in the Cuban government if they make better decisions."

He described it as "the Venezuela model."

This analysis aligns with recent reports indicating a strategic shift by the White House to distinguish between the Cuban state and private actors.

According to Bloomberg, the Trump administration is preparing guidelines to allow U.S. and foreign energy companies to sell fuel directly to private enterprises on the island.

A U.S. government source quoted by the agency explained that the fuel sales ban "applies only to the Cuban state, not private actors," and that under new Department of Commerce and Treasury guidelines, such operations "would not require a specific license" and would be permitted under current legislation.

In statements to Bloomberg News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. expects the communist regime to grant "greater economic and political freedoms" before easing the pressure.

Emergency Still Active, Pressure Unchanged

Although the oil tariff lacks legal basis after the Supreme Court ruling, the January 29 national emergency declaration remains in effect.

Other legal powers that allow imposing trade or regulatory restrictions have not been modified.

In fact, on February 13, Trump extended for a year the authority to regulate, inspect, and even detain U.S. and foreign vessels heading to Cuba, under national security and migration risk arguments.

In practical terms, eliminating the tariff reduces the immediate risk for countries or companies considering oil trade with the island.

However, it does not signify a lifting of the sanctions framework or a move toward normalization.

Meanwhile, the impact of the energy blockade is strongly felt in Cuba, a country experiencing six years of severe economic crisis and needing to import around two-thirds of its energy requirements.

Hospitals and public transport operate at minimal services, fuel is severely rationed, garbage accumulates due to lack of collection, and blackouts exceed 20 hours daily in large areas of the country.

According to the consulted experts, the tariff removal does not equate to structural relief. As Freyre warned, the administration "left the door open for other possible actions."

And as Kavulich reiterated, while the national emergency remains active, the order "can still be frightening."