Understanding U.S. Export Licenses to Cuba: What Politicians and Media Aren't Saying

Recent political statements and media reports have thrust U.S. export licenses granted to Miami businesses for trading with Cuba into the spotlight. A concerning narrative has emerged, suggesting that the Cuban Council of State and its ministries directly benefit from these licenses, that companies linked to the regime are making substantial purchases in the U.S., and that this occurs in blatant violation of federal regulations.

This narrative draws from actual documents from the Miami-Dade County Tax Collector, which highlight licenses with large sums and name Cuban state companies as "final recipients." While these documents are real and the amounts verifiable, the interpretation by some political platforms and media outlets reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how legal trade between the U.S. and Cuba operates.

This article aims to clarify how this system functions, why Cuban state firms are listed on the licenses, their actual role, and who ultimately receives the goods.

What Are SCP Licenses and Why Do They Exist?

The U.S. embargo on Cuba has been in place for over six decades, but federal exceptions allow for specific trade to avoid completely isolating the Cuban populace, which would not align with U.S. foreign policy goals.

The Support for the Cuban People (SCP) License Exception, outlined in Section 740.21 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), is a key mechanism. Managed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce, it permits exporting non-controlled items (classified as EAR99) to Cuba for purposes like improving living conditions, supporting independent economic activity, strengthening civil society, and facilitating free information flow.

These licenses typically stipulate that exported goods must be designated for the Cuban people, cannot be re-exported, should not primarily generate income for the Cuban government, and cannot be sold directly to the government.

The Cuban Trade Monopoly: Why State Companies Are the Sole Receivers

Understanding why companies like Consumimport and Alimpex appear on U.S. export licenses requires insight into Cuba's foreign trade system. Only entities authorized by the Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment can import or export, excluding small businesses or individual entrepreneurs. They must use authorized state companies as intermediaries.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment's (MINCEX) 166/2024 Resolution, along with updates through 2025, lists about 58 entities with this ability. The Cuban Directory of Authorized Entities specifies these state companies as the recipients on U.S. licenses, as only they are legally permitted to receive imports in Cuba.

When BIS issues a license, it requires a declared recipient in Cuba, which can only be these state companies, as the system is designed.

Middlemen, Not Beneficiaries: A Critical Distinction

The key misunderstanding in the political and media noise is that a Cuban state enterprise being listed as an "end user" on a BIS license does not mean it benefits from the goods. It serves as the mandatory channel for goods entering Cuba.

Sources involved in exports to Cuba, speaking to CiberCuba anonymously, clarified that there are two separate layers of documentation. The federal BIS license names state importers as "end users" due to the legal requirement that they receive imports. Meanwhile, shipping documents often list a small business or private sector entity as the final recipient, with the state importer acting as a legal intermediary.

Two independent sources confirmed that the actual recipients under these licenses are always small businesses or private Cuban buyers. U.S. companies mentioned in reports regularly sell to small businesses via these intermediaries, aligning with the SCP licenses' intent to support independent economic activity.

The Role of the Miami-Dade Tax Collector: Limits of Authority

Recent alarm stems from actions by Miami-Dade County Tax Collector Dariel Fernández, who initiated a review of companies trading with Cuba since September 2025, revoking local business licenses and publishing a transparency page with export license records linked to Cuba.

However, the Tax Collector's office, which administers local business and driver's license taxes, lacks jurisdiction over federal export regulation compliance. Only BIS and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the Treasury Department can determine regulatory violations. Neither agency has declared the scrutinized operations illegal.

Experts have publicly questioned these actions. Attorney John Maxwell, quoted by WLRN, noted that federal trade authorizations with Cuba are independent and don’t require state or local government approval, with federal statutes overriding local laws. Ricardo Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, labeled the Tax Collector's actions as politically motivated.

The Dangers of Mischaracterizing "Open Violation"

The most problematic leap in the constructed narrative is equating Cuban state companies listed as "end users" with a violation of federal regulations. If BIS issues licenses with specific formats and approved recipients, how is it a "violation" to adhere to those terms? Claiming otherwise implies Miami entrepreneurs who receive these licenses are potential federal offenders. Violating U.S. export regulations could lead to penalties, including fines up to one million dollars per infraction and up to 20 years in prison.

There’s a fundamental contradiction: If the U.S. issues licenses with specific conditions, how can following them be a "violation"? The SCP license framework was deliberately designed by Washington to operate this way.

Who Suffers if These Channels Close?

Political pressure to shut these legal trade channels has real consequences, not for Cuba's regime leaders, but for thousands of Cuban small businesses dependent on these SCP licenses for building materials, tools, appliances, and basic products. Revoking these licenses or eliminating embargo exceptions would hurt these private entrepreneurs, whom the U.S. policy ostensibly supports, while the state regime has its supply channels independent of SCP licenses.

Ironically, those quick to demand harsher measures against these Miami businesses claim to protect the Cuban people, yet by shutting down the only legal supply channel for Cuban small businesses, they risk causing the very harm they oppose.

Legitimate Concerns: Transparency and Access

While the system isn't perfect and legitimate questions remain, such as:

Transparency: What fees do Cuban state importers charge for mediating these transactions? How much of the product's final cost goes to the intermediary versus what the small business pays? This is a valid criticism of the regime: its trade monopoly inflates prices and extracts rents from the private sector.

Access Inequality: Do all small businesses have equal access to these importers, or is there political favoritism? Do companies linked to GAESA or the military receive preferential treatment?

Real Destination: Although sources confirm the documented end recipient is always a small business, what portion of the total imports through these licenses truly reaches the private sector versus what is retained or redirected by the state apparatus? This information is not publicly available.

Conclusion: Real Data, Misguided Interpretation

Export licenses exist, the amounts are real, and Cuban state companies named as "end users" are verifiable. But interpreting this data as proof of "the Council of State making million-dollar purchases" or as "open violations" of regulations is fundamentally flawed.

The state companies on these licenses are authorized importers whose legal role—under both Cuban regulations and U.S. license design—is to channel goods to small businesses and the private sector. Shipping documents, as confirmed by sector sources, affirm this in practice.

The Cuban regime deserves criticism for its trade monopoly, which is a control tool harming the private sector. However, critiques should be fact-based, not misinterpretations of legal documents. Confusing intermediaries with beneficiaries and legal licenses with violations, and misrepresenting support channels for the people as regime purchases, benefits only those seeking sensational headlines or an easy political stance.