Venezuelan and Cuban Military: A Comparative Analysis and Potential U.S. Operation in Cuba

Introduction

On January 3, 2026, the United States launched "Absolute Resolve," a lightning-fast operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro in under three hours. This historical event highlighted the stark contrast between the theoretical military capabilities of Venezuela and its actual combat readiness. For Cuba, which closely monitored Venezuela's swift downfall and suffered the loss of 32 intelligence officers in Caracas, a pressing question arises: how would a similar operation unfold in Cuba?

This article thoroughly examines the military capabilities of Venezuela (prior to January 3) and Cuba (as of January 2026). It reviews air defenses, aviation, armored vehicles, ground forces, and, importantly, the geographic and structural differences that would influence the outcome of a hypothetical U.S. operation targeting Havana.

Venezuelan Military Before January 3, 2026

Size and Structure of the Venezuelan Armed Forces

The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) boasted over 123,000 active personnel: 63,000 in the Army, 25,500 in the Navy, 11,500 in the Air Force, and 23,000 in the National Guard. On paper, it appeared formidable within the region. However, extreme politicization, corruption, lack of professional mid-level leadership, and low morale plagued the regular units, which focused more on internal control and illicit activities than on conventional warfare.

Air Defense: The Illusion of a Modern IADS

Venezuela invested billions in Russian, Chinese, and Iranian systems since the Chávez era, creating one of Latin America's densest integrated air defense networks on paper:

• Long-range systems: S-300VM (SA-23 "Gladiator/Giant"), Buk-M2E (SA-17 "Grizzly")
• Short-range systems: Pantsir-S1, S-125 Pechora-2M, MANPADS Igla
• Radars: 55Zh6M "Nebo-SV," 64N6E Gamma-DE, 1L119 "Kasta-2E2," Chinese JY-27A and JYL-1

Real State: Critical Operational Status

Prior analyses indicated that less than 50% of these systems were operational. Over 60% of the Chinese radar network was non-functional due to lack of parts and technical support. Equipment cannibalization was rampant, training sporadic, and dependency on foreign parts left the FANB in a precarious state.

Combat Aviation

Venezuela's inventory included:

• 21 Su-30MK2 Flankers (multi-role, Russian origin)
• Approximately 10 residual F-16s (acquired in the 1980s, lacking U.S. parts since 2006)
• Mi-35 attack helicopters, Mi-17 transports

Readiness: It was estimated that less than half could effectively fly due to fuel shortages, lack of parts, and limited flight hours.

Armored and Ground Forces

The Venezuelan army had:

• ~180 main battle tanks: 92 T-72B1Vs (modernized Russian), 81 AMX-30s (French, obsolete)
• 123 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-80A armored transports
• Artillery: Smerch and Grad MLRS, M-46 self-propelled guns

The units suffered from low training, scarce fuel, and irregular morale, with most unable to operate beyond battalion level.

Navy

The Venezuelan Navy was limited: 1 Mariscal Sucre frigate, 1 Type-209 submarine, patrol boats, and fast boats. It lacked real projection or air defense capabilities.

January 3: Collapse in Three Hours

Sequence of "Absolute Resolve"

H-hour -60 min: Cyber and electronic warfare began, cutting power in Caracas and disabling command and control of the IADS. EA-18G Growler aircraft jammed Venezuelan radars, forcing them to reveal positions.

H-hour -30 min: SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) commenced. F-35C and F-22 aircraft launched AGM-88 HARM missiles at SAM emitters tracking U.S. planes. Several Buk-M2E systems were destroyed on the ground without firing a missile.

H-hour: Helicopter assault. ~150 U.S. aircraft participated. MH-47 Chinook and MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from the 160th SOAR penetrated Miraflores in Caracas with Delta Force operators, leading to a direct assault on Fuerte Tiuna, where Maduro resided. He was captured after limited resistance.

H+180 min: Complete extraction. Helicopters with Maduro onboard returned to USS Iwo Jima, then transfer to the U.S.

Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces

Size and Structure

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) consist of:

• 50,000-76,000 active personnel: 35,000 in the Army, 5,000 in the Navy, 10,000 in Air Defense
• 39,000 reserves
• 90,000 paramilitaries (Territorial Troop Militias, Civil Defense)

The official doctrine is "War of All the People," involving total mobilization, territorial defense, and guerrilla warfare. However, this requires resources like ammunition, fuel, and food that Cuba lacks in 2026.

Air Defense: Obsolete Even After Modernization

Inventory:

• 144 S-125 Pechora-2BM launchers: Modernized in May 2025 with Belarusian assistance, mounted on T-55 chassis for mobility, with updated electronics
• Residual S-75s (1950s)
• MANPADS Igla

Without long-range systems like S-300 or S-400, and lacking an integrated IADS comparable to Venezuela's, the S-125 remains outdated. It was originally designed in the 1950s to intercept subsonic bombers and is ineffective against modern stealth aircraft with advanced electronic warfare capabilities.

Cuban Aviation: A Museum Collection

Inventory (on paper):

• 18 MiG-29s (fourth-generation multi-role, Soviet/Russian origin)
• 17 MiG-23s (third-generation interceptors, 1970s)
• 24 MiG-21s (second-generation interceptors, 1960s)
• ~12 Mi-17/24/35 helicopters (transport/attack)

A recent analysis states that Cuban MiG-29s are "currently inoperable." Without Russian parts, limited fuel, and poor maintenance, the Air Force is more decorative than functional. The MiG-23s and MiG-21s stand no chance against fifth-generation fighters and would likely be downed swiftly.

Armored Vehicles: T-55, T-62, and BMP-1 (1960s Technology)

Inventory:

• ~500 main battle tanks: T-54/55, T-62 (Soviet, 1950s-1960s)
• ~400 armored vehicles: BMP-1, BTR-60/BRDM
• Artillery: M-46, D-30 (towed), MLRS Grad

Despite some local modernization attempts, these vehicles remain vulnerable to modern threats like drones and precision missiles. Without sustained fuel, they are essentially rolling museum pieces.

Navy: Symbolic

Cuba possesses:

• 2 Pauk-class frigates (converted from fishing vessels, 1980s)
• 1 Delfín-class submarine (training mini-submarine, 200 tons, no real combat capability)
• Coastal patrol boats

The Cuban Navy lacks projection or air defense capabilities and is insignificant compared to U.S. naval power in the Caribbean.

Realistic Cuban Response Possibilities

Air Defense: Nonexistent

The S-125 Pechora-2BM, despite the 2025 Belarusian upgrade, remains technology from the 1950s. Against F-35/F-22 aircraft, EA-18G electronic warfare, and AGM-88 HARM missiles, they would be destroyed without a chance to retaliate, as was the case with more modern systems in Venezuela.

Aviation: Ineffective

Cuban MiG-29/23/21 aircraft are outmatched against fifth-generation fighters. Analysts believe they wouldn't even take off or would be shot down swiftly. A specialized analysis confirms that Cuban MiG-29s are "currently inoperable." Without sustained fuel, the Air Force remains largely ceremonial.

Armored and Ground Forces: Irrelevant in a Lightning Operation

In a Venezuela-like scenario (leader capture in 2-3 hours), T-55/T-62 tanks would lack the time and fuel for effective deployment. Their role would be post-incursion, during prolonged resistance or occupation, but without air support or logistics, they would collapse quickly.

Asymmetric Warfare (MTT, Guerrillas): Theoretical Potential, Material Limitations

The "War of All the People" doctrine is Cuba's only real strategic card. With over 1 million militiamen and a historical guerrilla tradition, it could wear down an occupying force over time. However:

• Crisis of morale: Exhausted population, mass exodus, doubtful fighting spirit in 2026 vs. 1961
• Lack of resources: Ammunition, food, fuel, and electricity depleted
• Doctrine requires leadership: With Díaz-Canel captured, the chain of command would be fractured, questioning its effectiveness
• Infeasible in a lightning raid: The doctrine is suited for prolonged resistance, not the immediate defense of strategic objectives against special operations

Navy: Insignificant

Two converted fishing vessel frigates and a mini-submarine cannot counter U.S. naval strength in the Caribbean.

CONCLUSION: Absolute Asymmetry

If Venezuela—with superior inventory, continental geography, and regional support—collapsed in three hours, Cuba would face an even faster and more decisive fate:

Factors Making Cuba More Vulnerable Than Venezuela

• Extreme geographical proximity: 90 miles from Florida vs. operations from multiple Caribbean bases facilitate U.S. logistics and response time
• Overwhelming technological superiority: The gap between F-35/F-22/EA-18G Growler vs. S-125/MiG-21 represents 70 years of military evolution
• Deeper prior structural collapse: Cuba in January 2026 is in a worse state than Venezuela in December 2025:
• Terminal electrical crisis (5 total collapses in 2025)
• Fuel depleted (no Venezuelan supply)
• Economy in freefall
• More vulnerable presidential target: El Laguito is a civilian residential area, unlike Fuerte Tiuna, which was a fortified military complex with a guard battalion, bunkers, and tunnels
• Completely inoperative aviation: MiG-29s out of service, no fuel for operations
• No credible external support: Russia and China have symbolic agreements but wouldn't militarily intervene in the Caribbean against the U.S.

Estimated Operation Time

2-3 hours from SEAD initiation to complete extraction (similar or faster than Caracas):

• H-30 min: SEAD (neutralization of S-125)
• H-hour: Assault on El Laguito (15-30 min on the ground)
• H+60-90 min: Complete extraction, forces "over the water"

Probability of Success

90-95%, higher than Venezuela's due to:

• Target in a civilian residential area, not a fortified military complex
• Obsolete air defenses (S-125 vs. S-300VM)
• Collapsed infrastructure (electricity, fuel)
• Geographical proximity to the U.S.
• Overwhelming technological superiority

Estimated Casualties

• U.S.: 0-2 (low risk due to extreme superiority)
• Cuba: 10-30 (MININT/personal guards, limited resistance)
• Civilians: 0-5 (if the operation is as surgical as Venezuela's)

The Only Real Cuban Capability

The "War of All the People" is Cuba's only military doctrine with real potential, but it's designed for prolonged asymmetric resistance post-invasion, not for immediate defense against lightning special operations.

In a leadership capture raid (2-3 hours), Territorial Militias wouldn't have time to mobilize. Without leadership, with collapsed logistics, or external support, their effectiveness in prolonged resistance would be limited, and the humanitarian cost to the civilian population could be devastating.

Critical Variable

The only critical operational variable for the U.S. is confirming Díaz-Canel's exact location at H-hour (El Laguito residence vs. Palace of the Revolution), which requires precise prior HUMINT/ISR intelligence. With that information, the operation is highly viable and likely to succeed quickly with minimal casualties.

The lesson from January 3, 2026, is clear: inventory on paper doesn't win wars; real operational capability does. In this regard, Cuba is in a worse position than Venezuela was when Maduro fell.