At the XI Plenary Session of the Communist Party, Miguel Díaz-Canel emphasized that "correcting distortions and jumpstarting the economy is not merely a slogan; it's a tangible battle for the stability of everyday life."
He acknowledged a decline in the Gross Domestic Product exceeding 4%, rampant inflation, and a crisis-ridden energy system. Yet, his solution remained unchanged: increased control, enhanced centralization, and more rhetoric about the "socialist state enterprise" as the engine of development.
The leader painted a picture of a country teetering on the brink of collapse without questioning the model that led to this state. According to his speech, the answer lies in blending "economic rigor with social justice," a feat, he claimed, that "only the socialist Revolution can guarantee."
This notion seems like a poorly timed joke when faced with reality: the so-called socialist "revolution" that purports to ensure justice is the very one responsible for the highest levels of inequality in the nation's recent history.
The Cuban paradox is glaring. The regime claims to defend equality while solidifying a dual-speed system: those with access to foreign currency—through tourism, remittances, or the informal market—and those surviving on devalued pesos.
The former can purchase food in MLC or essential goods, while the latter are left to rely on rationing and the black market. The discourse on social justice rings hollow in an economy that has institutionalized exclusion.
Díaz-Canel spoke of "leaping forward in the management of state enterprises" and "enhancing efficiency" but avoided addressing the obstacles to such progress: lack of autonomy, political interference, and administrative corruption.
The Cuban state enterprise does not follow market logic nor public welfare principles; instead, it adheres to ideological control. Managers are appointed based on political loyalty, not managerial merits; goals are set from above and adjusted for political convenience; losses are socialized, but profits are distributed opaquely.
In theory, the appointed leader advocates for "controlled autonomy" for MIPYMES and non-agricultural cooperatives. In practice, these entities struggle under a system of permits, licenses, and restrictions that stifles any real growth.
The State fears that a successful private sector might undermine the Party's economic monopoly, hence regulating its expansion more on political than economic grounds. Thus, every reform attempt becomes an act of institutional self-censorship.
The insistence on maintaining the state enterprise's prominence also carries ideological weight. Admitting state inefficiency would mean acknowledging the failure of the revolutionary narrative, which claims Cuban socialism is morally superior to capitalism.
Therefore, instead of accepting the centralized model's collapse, the regime's rhetoric chooses to forge ahead: promising change without enacting any.
Even when Dr. Díaz-Canel discusses "innovation," the economic environment remains plagued by scarcity, bureaucracy, and mistrust of private initiative. Entrepreneurs are tolerated only if they don't grow too large, farmers continue to lack resources, and exports are hindered by the absence of incentives and state intermediation. In this context, talk of efficiency is almost rhetorical.
The Cuban regime faces a structural crisis that won't be solved with slogans or "correction plans." The country's economy requires not a technical adjustment, but a political liberation. Without effective private ownership, genuine competition, institutional transparency, and the rule of law, efficiency is unattainable.
Díaz-Canel urged to "straighten the accounts, tackle inflation, and protect the most vulnerable." However, these tasks cannot be accomplished within a model that denies autonomy and punishes productivity. What the leader of "continuity" calls a "battle for stability" is, in reality, a war against the evidence: Cuban socialism, as currently conceived, does not work.
Díaz-Canel essentially stated that the so-called "revolution" will resolve the crisis. What the Cubans heard, however, is that they will remain in despair.
As long as power continues to mistake control for stability, the economy will continue its free fall, and Cubans will keep finding creative ways to resist a despotic power, with an increasingly clear objective of paving the way for true change that empowers them.
Understanding the Cuban Economic Crisis
What are the main economic challenges facing Cuba?
Cuba faces several economic challenges including a declining GDP, rampant inflation, and an energy system in crisis. These issues are exacerbated by a lack of market-driven policies, political interference, and a centralized economic model.
Why is the current economic model in Cuba considered ineffective?
The Cuban economic model is deemed ineffective due to its heavy reliance on centralized control, lack of autonomy for enterprises, and prioritization of ideological control over market efficiency. This results in economic stagnation and widespread inequality.
How does the dual-speed system affect Cuban society?
The dual-speed system in Cuba creates a divide between those with access to foreign currency and those reliant on devalued pesos. This leads to significant inequality, with some able to purchase essentials while others depend on rationing and the black market.