The American "Blockade" of Cuba: The Misleading Narrative and the Facts Behind It

The Cuban regime has amplified its rhetoric regarding the so-called American "blockade," a term frequently used in speeches and news programs to universally justify the country's shortages, power outages, and economic collapse.

This week, the propaganda campaign was intensified with a special segment on the national news, aimed at discrediting statements made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. In response to Miguel Díaz-Canel, Landau asserted that "there is no blockade" and that the real culprit for Cuba's misery is its own communist regime.

During the broadcast, official journalist Jorge Legañoa Alonso claimed that Washington's "economic suffocation" prevents Cuba from importing food, medicine, and fuel. However, data from U.S. agencies, international organizations, and independent sources paint a very different picture: Cuba actively trades with the United States, purchasing agricultural products, medicines, vehicles, machinery, and even receiving substantial humanitarian donations, which contradicts the narrative of isolation.

The Trade Reality Ignored by Cuban Media

Contrary to the narrative of an absolute blockade, trade between the two countries has steadily increased. From January to May 2025 alone, Cuba imported over $204.9 million worth of food from the United States, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This figure marks a 16.6% increase compared to the same period the previous year.

Chicken remains the primary import —amounting to $15.7 million in May— but the list also includes rice, powdered milk, coffee, vegetable oil, processed meat products, and humanitarian donations exceeding $10.7 million in the first five months of the year.

In March 2024, agricultural imports hit $40.6 million, twice the amount from March 2023, while total exports under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) amounted to $112.9 million in the first quarter alone. Since the enactment of this law in 2001, Cuba has purchased over $7.8 billion in food and agricultural products from the United States.

These numbers not only debunk the myth of a "food blockade" but also confirm that Washington allows and facilitates direct exports to the island, provided they are paid in cash and do not benefit sanctioned state entities.

Unveiling the Truth About Medicine Imports

The state-run news also claimed that the "blockade" prevents importing medicines, an assertion equally false. In July 2023, the U.S. Embassy in Havana announced that Washington had approved nearly $900 million in medical exports to Cuba since January of that year, and over $800 million in 2022, doubling the amount from 2021.

The embassy emphasized the ability to import medicines to Cuba, citing licenses from the Department of Commerce and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that permit the sale of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and hospital supplies under humanitarian exceptions.

These official statements contradicted Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, who had claimed there was "no possibility" of purchasing medicines in the U.S. market. The facts show the opposite: Cuba can and does buy U.S.-origin medical supplies, though its state-run distribution system and lack of currency exacerbate shortages in hospitals and pharmacies.

Industrial Goods and Energy Equipment Imports

In addition to food and medicines, significant imports include used vehicles, agricultural machinery, electric generators, household appliances, and industrial parts from the United States, totaling over $6.2 million in 2024.

The Cuba-U.S. Economic and Trade Council reported that these purchases encompassed generators, mineral mixing or grinding machinery, electric stoves and ovens, and motor vehicles. These figures are revealing because they dismantle another recurring official claim: that the embargo prevents maintaining electric and transportation infrastructure.

Data show that the Cuban government has been able to acquire energy equipment, spare parts, and industrial machinery in the U.S. market, exposing internal inefficiencies of the state system, not external impositions.

Spending Priorities: Cars Over Food

The disparity in spending priorities is particularly telling. In August 2024, Cuba spent 46 times more on importing used cars than on food, according to U.S. Commerce Department data. Cuban small and medium enterprises (SMEs) acquired vehicles for $8.68 million, while food imports barely reached $176,000.

These transactions occurred under special licenses from the Treasury Department, which since 2023 have permitted the sale of vehicles, trucks, and agricultural machinery to private workers, excluding state companies.

The country that Havana accuses of "blocking" it, in fact, authorizes an increasing volume of trade with its private sector, which the regime itself restricts or heavily taxes. Global data confirm this is not an isolated incident. Between January and July 2024, Cuba spent $36 million importing vehicles from the U.S., four times more than in all of 2023.

This increase was made possible by embargo relaxations approved by the Biden administration, which classified the sale of cars and machinery to private entrepreneurs as a "humanitarian" measure. In contrast, food imports fell by 2.6% in July of that year, a decline attributed to internal price control policies that discouraged purchases. The scarcity stems not from the embargo but from an inefficient economic structure and a lack of productive incentives within the island.

Narrative vs. Commercial Reality

While Cuban television news describes an "besieged" economy, U.S. government data show otherwise:

• Cuba ranks as the 46th market for U.S. agricultural and food exports.
• In 2025 alone, U.S. exports to Cuba have grown by more than 20% year-over-year.
• U.S. humanitarian donations—food, medicines, and supplies—exceeded $36 million in 2023 and continue to rise.

Neither the trade flow nor the humanitarian licenses align with the idea of a total "blockade." What exists is a targeted embargo—a network of financial and trade restrictions—designed to pressure the regime, not the Cuban people, and which contains multiple exceptions precisely to avoid a humanitarian impact.

Cuba's Global Trade Freedom

One of the weakest arguments in the official narrative is the notion that the U.S. "blockade" prevents Cuba from trading with the rest of the world. In reality, no embargo law prohibits third countries from freely trading with the island.

Russian, Chinese, European, or Latin American companies can—and have for decades—sell fuel, food, machinery, or pharmaceuticals to the Cuban regime. The obstacle is neither political nor legal but economic: the lack of liquidity and the Cuban state's inability to pay.

China and Russia have maintained energy and technology cooperation agreements with Cuba for years, including investments in thermoelectric plants, transportation, hospital equipment, and medical technology. However, many of these projects have stalled due to repeated payment defaults and lack of credit guarantees.

European companies have also experienced years-long payment delays, despite refinancing agreements reached after the partial cancellation of Cuba's debt in 2015. In fact, international organizations like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have reiterated that there is no prohibition preventing Cuba from buying or selling on the global market, as long as it complies with international banking and payment norms.

The problem is that Cuba either doesn't pay or pays late and poorly.

A Country Without Credit: Another Cause of Shortages

Alongside the formal freedom of trade is a harsh reality: Cuba is one of the world's lowest credit-rated countries. It has lacked access to international capital markets since the 1980s when it unilaterally suspended its external debt payments.

In 2015, the Paris Club forgave $8 billion of the $11 billion owed in exchange for annual payment commitments that the regime defaulted on again in 2019. Since then, its arrears exceed $3 billion with that group of creditors alone.

Russia has also forgiven debts exceeding $30 billion, while China maintains discretionary soft credit lines subject to geopolitical, not financial, interests. Even ideological allies like Venezuela or Algeria have drastically reduced their support due to the lack of economic return.

The result is that Cuba cannot access international credit and must pay everything upfront, increasing the cost of any import. There are no banks willing to finance its purchases because the risk of default is too high.

Thus, although the regime insists on talking about a "financial blockade," the truth is that its own history of delinquency has caused the isolation.

As a recent report by the Latin American Economic Observatory (OBELA) acknowledged, "the central problem of the Cuban economy is not external sanctions but its structural financial inviability: low productivity, unpayable debt, and lack of fiscal transparency."

Conclusion: The Narrative vs. the Facts

The empirical evidence reveals an undeniable pattern: the United States does not block Cuba; the Cuban State blocks its own people. The embargo laws allow and regulate trade that has exceeded $8 billion over two decades, covering food, medicines, machinery, vehicles, and donations.

Meanwhile, Díaz-Canel's government continues to allocate millions to car imports or tourist projects while hospitals lack antibiotics and markets are empty. The "genocidal blockade" propaganda persists as a political tool to justify an internal structural crisis: low productivity, corruption, state control, and the absence of economic freedoms.

As Christopher Landau pointedly asked, "If there really were a blockade, how do Mexican oil, European tourists, and American cars get in?"

The numbers confirm it: the siege is not from Washington but from Havana's economic apparatus, which stifles its own people while demanding international sympathy for an embargo that, in practice, does not prevent buying but rather accountability.