Cuban Government Faces Another Fuel Crisis Amidst Mounting Disbelief

The Cuban government has admitted that the nation is grappling with yet another fuel crisis just two years after promising an "energy recovery" following the 2023 collapse. Vicente de la O Levy, the Minister of Energy and Mines, revealed on state television this Friday that "there isn't enough fuel for the entire month of October," with Cuba possessing reserves sufficient for only "a few days."

This announcement comes amid widespread power outages, partial and complete collapses of the National Electric System (SEN), partial transport shutdowns, and visible deterioration in the national economy. The minister explained that the SEN remains "very weak" due to the simultaneous shutdown of three thermal plants, resulting in a loss of 270 megawatts. Additional breakdowns at Renté, Felton, and Nuevitas, combined with a diesel shortage for distributed generation engines, have left over 600 MW offline.

"We've secured a small amount of fuel, but it's not enough for the whole month. It's being distributed among Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago de Cuba," stated De la O Levy, while emphasizing the government's collaboration with the Electric Union (UNE) and Cuba-Petroleum (CUPET) to mitigate the shortfall.

A Recurring Scenario: The 2023 Crisis

The minister's words echo the narrative of 2023, when the government acknowledged an "emergency situation" due to fuel shortages. In September of that year, De la O Levy admitted that the country was "out of fuel," having nearly exhausted its reserves, impacting both electricity generation and transportation. Conveniently, such crises often follow the failed efforts to "reduce blackouts" during the summer.

During early 2023, Cuba experienced one of the worst energy crises in decades: long lines at gas stations, halted public transportation, and blackouts lasting up to 20 hours. The minister and other high-ranking officials warned the nation was facing a "critical scenario" due to a lack of funding to import hydrocarbons.

In April and May 2023, authorities acknowledged that the supply relied on "irregular arrivals" of fuel with no strategic reserves in place. "We aren't sure how we'll get through this," admitted then-leader Miguel Díaz-Canel in mid-April. By September, the regime had ordered "energy-saving measures" within state agencies and admitted that the fuel allocated for electricity generation "was insufficient to meet national demand."

The "Economic Reorganization": A Misguided Solution

The 2023 crisis served as a pretext for the regime to implement new measures under the "economic reorganization," presented as structural solutions but ultimately exacerbating inequality and worsening the underlying issue. In December 2023, Díaz-Canel announced a fuel price reform, increasing gasoline and diesel costs fivefold and shifting sales to freely convertible currency (MLC). "When we raise fuel prices, other prices will rise," the leader casually warned from the Palace.

"Fuel cannot be sold at a subsidized rate," declared then-Minister of Economy and Planning, the now-ousted Alejandro Gil Fernández. The government's stated goal was "ensuring supply sustainability," but the measure had immediate consequences: restricting energy access to those with foreign currency, leaving out most Cubans with non-convertible peso incomes.

Instead of stabilizing the market, the change created an energy duality: MLC stations with unaffordable prices and peso gas stations nearly always empty. State and private transport operators couldn't acquire fuel, halting routes, reducing mobility, and increasing the cost of distributing food and basic goods. The supposed "modernization of the energy system" was, in reality, a strategy to gather foreign currency in a cash-strapped country, sacrificing public access to an essential service.

Propaganda and Misinformation: The "Blockade" Narrative

Whenever the crisis worsens, the official discourse turns to political propaganda. Since 2023, both Minister De la O Levy and Díaz-Canel have consistently blamed the "U.S. blockade" and "external financial limitations." "If the blockade is lifted, there are a ton of solutions," assured the leader appointed by Raúl Castro to "lead" the regime's so-called "continuity" in December 2023.

Yet, government reports themselves reveal that the shortage also stems from poor internal management, lack of investment in refining and transportation, and the state's inability to diversify import sources. While officials promise transparency, the population remains literally and figuratively in the dark. Announcements of "rotating blackout schedules" are rarely met, and official information is often delayed or lacking verifiable data.

In September 2023, the minister promised that the country "would not experience prolonged blackouts again," a claim quickly disproven by reality. By 2024, the discourse of "gradual recovery" was repeated, and now there's an open acknowledgment that the country is once again running out of fuel.

Since the "blockade" is blamed, no one takes responsibility for the enormous economic failure causing such suffering among the population.

October 2025: Between Exhaustion and Distrust

The minister's recent statements confirm what the public has sensed for months: Cuba is trapped in an endless cycle of crises with no visible escape. The regime annually announces an "energy recovery plan," but the root causes—lack of investment, debt, technological obsolescence, and import dependency—remain unchanged.

The newly acknowledged fuel shortage not only affects electricity generation and transport but also directly impacts the domestic economy: reduced food transport, factory closures, liquefied gas shortages, and increased social unrest. Protests and pot-banging have been reported in neighborhoods of Havana, Holguín, and Santiago during the longest blackouts, reflecting public frustration with a state that promises solutions but only offers excuses.

The economic reorganization measures did not solve the fuel problem; they transformed it into a mechanism of exclusion and control. Two years later, the country still relies on small batches of imported hydrocarbons and "creatively resists" the empty official promises that cyclically repeat as the power system crumbles and the economy contracts.

The government has turned each crisis into a propaganda tool, but reality can no longer be sustained by speeches. Neither currency prices nor new rotation schemes nor appeals to the "blockade" have prevented Cuba from entering yet another critical cycle of blackouts, shortages, and widespread distrust.